Abstract The offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 has been confirmed as the most appropriate ground for convicting a reckless transmission of the HIV virus through sexual intercourse.
party harbours a different 'intention' or 'need' to the other party, who is deceived on this matter? 6 Could this vitiate consent? The answer in relation to rape appears to be 'no', but the element of deception and the phrase 'informed consent' both combine to cause particular difficulties in HIV transmission cases, where the word 'informed' can constitute many different actions, and where 'deception' does lead to prosecution (albeit for malicious wounding).
This article will focus mainly on deception, knowledge and informed consent in relation to the transmission of the HIV under s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, but a discussion outlining the recent debates on informed consent in the field of sexual offences will be addressed. The recent theory suggesting that a mistake as to fact can vitiate consent holds an interesting connection to deceptive HIV cases.
When is consent 'informed' in sexual offences?
Removing the specific issue of HIV transmission from the equation for the moment, consenting to sex is not as simple as it sounds. The offence of rape in the UK places an emphasis on consent rather than force, which, as Bohlander points out, leads to the impression that rape in the UK does not require force or threats, leading to various other options when vitiating consent.
7 Section 74 of the 2003 Act states as follows:
For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.
It is difficult to decipher what exactly Parliament meant by this simple definition. The words 'choice' and 'freedom' clearly relate to the use of force, and 'capacity' is a reference to a person's sound mind capable of providing consent. Elliott and De Than argue that the real issue behind s. 74 is whether a person has the freedom and capacity to agree, because when a person is consenting to something, he is effectively agreeing to it; whether or not he had a choice really does not matter. 8 However, 'freedom' in s. 74 can also refer to the more contentious issue of deception: we are not entirely 'free' to accept a 'thing' until we know every relevant detail about that thing. Jonathan Herring was the first to canvas this idea in detail in relation to rape. He put forward the following provision:
(ii) had s/he known the truth about that fact would not have consented to it, then s/he did not consent to the sexual activity. 9 The difficulties with this provision are clear. According to Herring, a victim can be mistaken as to any 'fact', which will in turn invalidate her consent to sex. The list of mistaken facts could be endless; anything from the defendant's age to his future intentions with the victim (or lack of them) could be considered as mistaken facts and therefore grounds to vitiate consent. In practice this is unworkable. Hyman Gross took a practical approach to Herring's proposal, reminding us that the act of sex is still consented to, and that the immoral intentions of the defendant were not to be placed on a elevated moral plane for us to judge and punish. 10 Herring's proposal was also connected to instances where intercourse was for a particular purpose, such as a display to the victim of the defendant's plans to share a future together. If the victim was being deceived as to this purpose behind the act of intercourse, this deceptive fact would be sufficient to vitiate the victim's consent. This has been described as disrespectful to sexually autonomous persons by Gross, who does concede that s. 76 of the 2003 Act provides that the victim can be deceived as to the nature and purpose of the sexual act consented to, but that it is the victim's own prerogative to exercise scepticism when being influenced by the defendant.
11 Clearly, the chance that a defendant can be deceptive as to his intentions with the victim, or his feelings towards the victim, is causing an air of unrest to surround the ambiguous s. 74. The provisions under s. 76 regarding 'deception', 'nature' and 'purpose' do not help, creating the notion that a victim can be deceived about almost anything.
Even though Herring may have been considered by some writers to be taking the element of informed consent too far, his ideas about mistake and deception closely connect to the malicious transmission of HIV. If a victim is deceived about this fact, consent is vitiated, but not as to the act of intercourse, but to the offence of malicious wounding under s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
12 All the recent case law in this area suggests that in order to consent to contracting HIV, the victim's consent must be 'informed', and the defendant must have an honest belief in such consent. 13 It will be shown that the 'informed consent' is currently the victim's responsibility and can come in many guises, and the defendant must simply believe that the victim has done her research, leaving him to bear no responsibility as an 'informant' to divulge his status. In R v Clarence 16 the interpretation of 'inflict' in s. 20 implied an assault or a battery of which grievous bodily harm was the 'direct, immediate and obvious result'. 17 The defendant had sexual intercourse with his wife aware that he had gonorrhoea, although his wife had no knowledge of this. Transmission of infection was held not to be included within the s. 20 definition because there was deemed to be 'a crucial difference' between an immediate and necessary connection of a cut or a blow and the uncertain and delayed operation of an infection. 18 The House of Lords submitted that the consent would only be vitiated if it was obtained by fraud as to either the nature of the act, or the identity of the agent. 19 In addition, the victim was found to have consented to the infected act as intercourse during marriage in 1888 was assumed to be consensual. 20 The victim's knowledge of transmission (or rather lack of) was therefore irrelevant. The position was changed by R v ClarenceWilson, 21 in which it was confirmed that notwithstanding the absence of an assault, infliction of grievous bodily harm under s. 20 could be committed:
grievous bodily harm may be inflicted where the accused has directly inflicted it . . . or . . . where the accused has 'inflicted' it by doing something intentionally which . . . is not in itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim.
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This decision represented a major erosion of the authority of Clarence. If psychiatric injury can be inflicted without direct or indirect violence, for the purposes of section 20 physical injury may be similarly inflicted. It is no longer possible to discern the critical difference identified by the majority in Clarence between an 'immediate and necessary connection' between the relevant blow and the consequent injury, and the 'uncertain and delayed' effect of the act which led to the eventual development of infection.
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The uncertain and delayed development of infection was no longer distinguished from an immediate and direct physical harm, and Clarence was overruled. When bodily harm occurs during sexual encounters, the rules regarding consent have been strict. The Court of Criminal Appeal took a strict line in R v Donovan 27 where the defendant beat a 17-year-old girl with a cane for sexual gratification:
As a general rule, it is an unlawful act to beat another person with such a degree of violence that the infliction of bodily harm is a probable consequence, and when such an act is proved, consent is immaterial. 28 Similarly, Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) 29 later held that it was not in the public's interest to allow people to 'cause and/or intend to cause' each other bodily harm 'for no good reason'. 30 This dictum has inevitably been described as 'vague in the extreme' by Giles, 31 and Ormerod submits that it goes too far, claiming that the use of the phrase 'and/or' implies that an act done to another with consent is an assault even if harm is unintended or unforeseen. 32 The Journal of Criminal Law either intends to cause harm and/or does cause harm crosses the line of non-consensual activity. The issues surrounding sexual consent and non-fatal offences were analysed in detail in R v Brown. 33 The appellants-a group of homosexual sado-masochists-willingly and enthusiastically participated in the commission of acts of violence against each other for sexual pleasure. Consent was held to be a defence to non-sexual offences against the person such as common law assault, 34 but the difficult issue for the House of Lords in Brown was whether the defence of consent could be extended to cover the infliction of bodily harm in the course of homosexual sado-masochistic encounters. 35 The House of Lords ruled that sado-masochistic practices were unpredictably dangerous, degrading, violent, and injurious to individuals and harmful to society generally, 36 and although public policy was probably the main reason behind the Brown decision, it was apparent that the spread of diseases contributed to the rationale. 37 This makes the supposition that Brown only applies to homosexual behaviour doubtful.
A fine line has been drawn between common law assault and s. 47 of the 1861 Act. Consent is only a defence to the latter if the circumstances fall into a well-known exception. 38 This fine line, affirming Lord Lane CJ's dictum in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980), appears very fragile. Might the difference between an assault and a trivial bodily harm be too fine to be put to a jury? 39 The application of Brown was narrowed considerably in the light of R v Wilson, 40 and both cases were distinguished despite very similar facts. 41 It was held not to be in the public's interest to consider consensual activity between a husband and wife as a matter for criminal investigation. 42 This decision has been contested by several commentators, who argue that the rationale in Brown should be applied to all 33 [1994] 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49 Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when Transmitting HIV harmful sexual activities. 43 Surely this is correct? In R v Emmett 44 a heterosexual couple engaged in dangerous sexual activities leading to haemorrhages, bruising, burns, and a charge under s. 47. The Court of Appeal held that there was to be no distinction between sadomasochistic activities in heterosexual and homosexual encounters, but it is not clear just how seriously this decision has been taken. The rationale behind Emmett was that the injuries sustained 'crossed the line of consent' drawn in Brown, confirming that the line of consent in Brown applies not just to homosexuals, but to all dangerous sexual exploits which cause harm. 45 
Dica
46 drew an interesting line regarding consent and HIV transmission. The defendant concealed his HIV status and transmitted the HIV virus to two women. Dica was distinguished from the violent acts in Brown on the basis that Dica and his partners were not intent on spreading disease or indulging in serious violence for the purposes of sexual gratification. They are simply prepared, knowingly, to run the risk-not the certainty-of infection. 47 From one view, it seems logical that consensual acts of intercourse are not unlawful merely because there may be a known risk to the health of a participant-people may take risks. But from another view, the public policies (and the line of consent) which were so central to Brown do not appear to be relevant to the spread of the HIV virus. Judge LJ elaborated on the consent issue in Konzani, 48 in which the defendant, who knew of his HIV positive status, had consensual intercourse with three unsuspecting women, all of which contracted the HIV virus. Judge LJ declared that:
For the complainant's consent to the risks of contracting the HIV virus to provide a defence, her consent must be an informed consent. The concealment of [HIV] almost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant . . . the defendant's honest belief must be concomitant with the consent which provides a defence. 49 It is logical that the defendant cannot hold a reasonable belief in consent if he has not divulged his status. Weait comments that the judgment in Konzani is a radical interpretation of recklessness going beyond conscious, unjustifiable risk-taking and requiring an additional element of non-disclosure. 50 This certainly seems to be the case at first 43 52 temporarily placing the law of consent in a difficult quandary in relation to transmission of infection. Any conduct causing actual bodily harm for a purpose which did not fall under one of Lord Jauncey's exceptions was considered a hostile application of force and thus over the consensual threshold. 53 In the 10 years between Brown in 1994 and Dica in 2004, non-infected long-term partners of HIV carriers could not consent to unprotected sex: any unprotected intercourse which did take place would thus have been rape. 54 This was a highly objectionable outcome, and has been described as 'distasteful' and 'startling'. 55 For the foreseeable future, R v EB establishes that whilst the transmission of disease is not consented to, the act of sexual intercourse still is, and thus no rape charge will incur. Latham LJ held that where one party to sexual activity has a sexually transmissible disease which is not disclosed to the other party, any consent that may have been given to that activity by the recipient is not thereby vitiated. The act of intercourse remains a consensual act. 56 This prevents any chance of s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003-and Herring's 'mistaken sex' theory-wading into the mire to contend that if a victim is mistaken as to the nature, purpose, or a fact regarding sexual intercourse, consent to that intercourse is vitiated. 62 Should individuals exercise their voluntary choice to contract a disease? Let us say that X and Y are in a long-term relationship, but X contracts HIV through a blood transfusion. X and Y still wish to marry and spend their lives together, so Y agrees to have unprotected sex with X in the hope that she will one day conceive and give birth to a healthy baby. Because the transmission of the HIV virus is a s. 20 offence, according to Brown Y cannot consent, but applying Dica and Konzani, if Y is fully aware of the risk, her consent is a defence as long as it is 'informed'. To limit the risk to the general public, perhaps the law on the transmission of HIV should revert back to Brown allowing only married couples to consent to such a risk. Or, perhaps, the context of the harm and the attitudes of the parties could be considered when determining whether the transmission of infection counts as an exception to the general rule. For example, if V, who is in a long-term relationship, finds out that she is terminally ill she may wish to consummate her relationship with her HIV+ partner knowing that she is unlikely to experience the slow effects of the virus. This behaviour does not seem as reckless as that in Dica or Konzani.
It seems strange that the law can articulate when a person cannot consent to certain behaviour (such as fighting outside public houses), but can consent to other serious harms. Ormerod believes that we are left with three possible answers to the question 'when does an act done to P with P's consent amount to an assault?' which are: (1) when injury is caused: Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980); (2) when injury is likely to be caused (R v Boyea below); and (3) when D is aware that injury might be caused and takes the unjustifiable risk of causing it. 63 These varied options have been questioned by several writers. 64 Even if the resulting harm was unforeseen, this does little to exonerate the defendant. In R v Boyea 65 the defendant did not intend to harm his victim when they engaged in dangerous sexual activities, but because harm had been 'intended or caused'-as per Lord Lane CJ in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) -the victim's consent was completely irrelevant. 66 It is submitted that if transmission of an infection occurs accidentally, unforeseeably, and with full consent to the act of intercourse, it may be unfair to place culpability on either party.
As the law currently stands, any participant can consent to contracting HIV. This suggests that the defendant must know of his HIV status, but some sufferers may either be afraid to get tested or act completely recklessly. Does the defendant's knowledge make a difference to the victim's consent? The distinction between which information is relevant for a valid and informed consent and which is not remains unclear after Konzani.
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The defendant's state of mind A defendant's deceptive state of mind has been a controversial issue recently in relation to rape. The most innovative suggestion, by Herring, is that intercourse under false pretences is intercourse for a different purpose than that consented to, thus invalidating consent. 68 Although it has been contended that a rape conviction should not result simply because the victim was mistaken as to a simple fact, or to protect people against the disappointments and humiliations of their bad judgement, 69 the issue of deception will remain relevant as long as the laws of sexual offences in the UK are worded around the issue of informed consent 63 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49 Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when Transmitting HIV rather than the use of force. 70 Although it is not currently deemed reasonable to implement Herring's theory of 'mistaken sex' in relation to rape, if a victim is mistaken that her sexual partner is HIV negative when he is in fact HIV positive, and he intentionally deceives her about this fact, he is open to being convicted of malicious wounding. 71 It can be argued that in all instances where a defendant hides his HIV status, he is being deceptive, but the recent changes in the law have not placed any such responsibility on the shoulders of the defendant to inform his victim of this fact. How can the defendant harbour an honest belief in the victim's consent if he himself has not divulged his HIV status? The main issue now is: in what ways can a victim be informed, how informed does she have to be, and who can be the informant?
It has been suggested by Bronitt that an individual can be aware of a risk of infecting another without having actual knowledge of his or her own infection. 72 This may not be logical: to be 'aware' of a risk implies knowledge that one poses a risk. The work of Spencer 73 was referred to in Dica, who argues that liability materialises if a defendant knows he has or may have a grave disease and that his behaviour involves a risk of transmission. 74 Presently, the judgment of Dica requires the defendant to know he has HIV, 75 and the consensus is that this is the correct approach. 76 Weait concludes that the only way to escape liability post-Dica is to (a) disclose infection; or (b) never get tested. 77 This is called into question by Konzani.
78 Judge LJ has claimed that the ultimate question is not knowledge but consent, but he has also submitted that it is unlikely that one would consent to a risk if one were ignorant of it. 
The victim's state of mind
Many writers agree with Judge LJ in Dica that consent is not an issue in HIV transmission cases, the result being rape if it was. 80 However , 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49 The Journal of Criminal Law disagreement has arisen regarding knowledge. Recent debates with regard to informed consent under s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 have suggested instances where a defendant may face some kind of criminal reprimand for lying to his or her partner, particularly in relation to what the intercourse stood for. Herring argues that in order for a decision to carry the weight we expect of autonomy, we need to ensure that the decision-maker is aware of the key facts involved in making the decision. 81 It is an interesting idea that consent can be vitiated if the victim-if he or she had known the truth-would not have consented. Bohlander warns that Herring has gone too far, arguing that the harm that is being done to the victim by the defendant at the moment of intercourse is that she is being duped, not that she is being penetrated. The harm is thus psychological, not physical.
82 This is not the case in HIV transmission cases, however, where the defendant has been deceptive as to his HIV status resulting in harm to the victim. Of course, Gross's argument that the act of sex is still consented to regardless of any trivial mistakes made by the victim is just as relevant in HIV transmission cases as it is in rape cases-the act of intercourse itself remains unaffected despite a disease being passed. Lord Latham LJ in R v EB is correct when he states that a victim is not consenting to the disease, but she is still consenting to the intercourse: 'as a matter of law, the fact that the defendant may not have disclosed his HIV status is not a matter which could in any way be relevant to the issue of consent under section 74 . . . such consent did not include consent to infection by the disease'. 83 The issue now is to decipher what exactly the victim must know in order to provide a properly informed consent, and whether any element of deceptiveness on the part of the defendant plays a part in vitiating the consent.
Spencer states that consent to a risk of infection must presuppose full knowledge of the facts-suspecting is not enough. 84 This seems reasonable, but it would shift the evidential burden onto the victim. Can a victim provide an informed consent if her knowledge is sourced from a place other than the defendant? If 'yes', this would render the defendant's knowledge of his own HIV status irrelevant, leading to the dangerous assumption that the assailant need not divulge his status at all. The ratio of Dica was read in R v Barnes 85 to mean that a defendant who discloses his condition will have a defence if 'despite this knowledge they were still prepared to accept the risks involved and consented to having sexual intercourse with him'. 86 By suggesting that social interactions can produce an informed consent, Judge LJ has rejected the stipulation that the defendant must reveal his condition to hold an honest belief in the consent. This allows a defendant to be completely reckless, and places a significant burden on the victim to look into the sexual history of his or her partner before consenting. Additionally, Judge LJ believes that a victim's implied consent may only be obvious when cross-examined. How is a defendant to confirm such an illusive informed consent at the time of the act itself? It is foreseen that this loophole will be employed by numerous assailants. Whilst it is completely feasible that a victim could provide an informed consent to the risk of HIV without the defendant disclosing this information, should some responsibility not be imposed upon the defendant? Let us imagine that when X received his contaminated blood transfusion, X's doctor took Y to one side and told Y that her partner was HIV positive, but X does not disclose his condition directly to Y. According to one reading of Konzani, X's honest belief in Y's consent is still missing because it was not X who disclosed the information. According to another reading of Konzani, Y's informed consent will suffice as a defence. Is it possible that Judge LJ meant that a victim can derive his or her knowledge from any source, but the defendant must be informedby the victim-that this knowledge exists? Should X check with Y that she is aware of his condition? It may be more logical to keep the burden on the defendant to check that the victim is aware of the situation.
As a result of both Dica and Konzani, it seems as though a person can consent to the transmission of HIV under s. 20 if those risks have been directly or indirectly disclosed to him or her by any source. Realistically, full knowledge is difficult to attain. If V's partner is not willing to divulge the true nature of his sexual health, does V have any other choice than to take a risk? Alternatively, can wilful blindness on the part of the victim suffice as knowledge? Devlin J was clearly of the view in R v Roper 90 that a wilful refusal to make inquiries was equivalent to knowledge. 91 With respect to Devlin J, the refusal to make inquiries is difficult It is submitted that Konzani has opened the defence of consent far too wide in relation to HIV transmission cases. A defendant has plenty of freedom to manoeuvre, while the victim has very little.
A way forward for reckless HIV transmission
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was not designed to discourage the spread of infectious diseases. Interestingly, an offence of administering a noxious substance under s. 23 has been suggested in HIV transmission cases instead of s. 20, but sexual intercourse is unlikely to be considered as 'administering'. 93 In its report Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General Principles, the Law Commission expressed the view that intentional or reckless transmission of disease should be capable of constituting an offence against the person.
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A second publication, Consent in the Criminal Law, made a provisional proposal that precluded a defence of consent for the proposed offence of recklessly causing seriously disabling injury. 95 This approach was described as 'sensible'. 96 In 1998, the Home Office issued a Consultation Paper entitled Violence: Reforming the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
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In this paper, the government had not accepted the recommendation that there should be offences to enable the intentional or reckless transmission of disease to be prosecuted. The government was particularly concerned that the law would 'discriminate against those who were HIV positive, have AIDS or viral hepatitis or who carry any kind of disease'. 98 It then proposed that the criminal law should apply only to those whom it can be proved beyond reasonable doubt had deliberately transmitted a disease intending to cause serious injury. 99 This suggestion seems to sway more towards s. 18 convictions for intentional transmission of HIV, but since it is never certain that the virus will be transmitted during intercourse, such behaviour could only ever be reckless. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49 The Journal of Criminal Law would mean that the definition of consent under s. 74 would become directly relevant to HIV transmission, rather than using the rules of consent under non-fatal offences. In order to allow a 'victim' to make a free and informed consent to the HIV offence under the new s. 3A, her knowledge must not be allowed to be derived from another source other than the defendant. Perhaps s. 74 could be amended to read as follows:
A person consents if he or she agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice, from all the relevant information divulged by the accused.
Whilst maintaining the positions of Dica and Konzani, these provisions place responsibility back onto the defendant.
Conclusion
It has been decided that for an individual to consent to contracting HIV through sexual intercourse, his or her consent must be informed and the accused must have an honest belief in such consent. However, it has been shown that as a result of Konzani: (1) the victim's knowledge may be derived from several sources, allowing the defendant to claim an honest belief despite hiding his HIV status, and (2) the victim's informed consent may only come through in cross-examination, making it difficult for the defendant to be aware of the informed consent at the time of the intercourse. These oversights greatly reduce the defendant's burden of responsibility. Without a clear statutory offence, these 'get-out clauses' leave the door open for reckless individuals simply to 'assume' informed consent before embarking on infected intercourse. A new offence of transmitting HIV through sexual intercourse has been suggested to overcome the loophole in Konzani and Dica by allowing for a conviction where a person knows or may know he has the HIV virus and fails to tell his sexual partner. This element of disclosure is also an integral part of the defence of consent in an amended version of s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ensuring that the new offence places the burden of proof to disclose HIV status firmly back onto the defendant.
It remains unclear why an individual can consent to contracting a grave disease under s. 20 yet may not consent to minor harm under s. 47 of the 1861 Act. Whilst Dica endeavours to support the issue of autonomy by establishing that an individual can knowingly consent to the s. 20 offence of HIV transmission, several questions are raised on public policy. Why has Dica crossed the line of consent? Judge LJ distinguished Dica from Brown on the basis of violence and degradation, 105 but apart from the defendants' characteristics, i.e. homosexuality, the issues at hand are not that different. Whilst it may be true that sado-masochistic activities are more violent than 'conventional' sexual intercourse, was not the decision in Brown based on public policy and the spread of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49 Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when Transmitting HIV disease and infection?
